El Futuro de la Política Exterior Alemana

IP–Global publica una entrevista con Guido Westerwelle sobre el futuro de la política exterior alemana, que lo más probable es que quede bajo su mando. En el Gobierno Federal, cada ministro es independiente y responsable del diseño de las políticas (Ressortprinzip) de su cartera, mismas que deben estar en el marco de los principios determinados por el jefe de Gobierno o Canciller (Richtlinienkompetenz).

La entrevista completa aquí (en la foto Guido Westerwelle y Hans-Dietrich Genscher)

En la entrevista Westerwelle habla sobre Europa, la relación trastlántica, Afganistán, el nuevo orden mundial y los llamados "rogue o difficult states". Aquí copio unas preguntas interesantes.

IP: Europe
With the decision handed down by Germany’s Constitutional Court, what are the prospects for the European project if the role of national parliaments is to be strengthened? Can Germany continue to function as a motor of integration? And is the issue now one of expanding or of deepening the Union?

Westerwelle: Expanding and deepening the European Union are not contradictory objectives. However, the most pressing issue at the moment is to ensure that the European Union is able to continue fulfilling its vital function. The Lisbon Treaty is a milestone in this respect and an important prerequisite for the success of all subsequent steps towards integration.

The German Constitutional Court’s ruling on Lisbon emphasizes that in transferring sovereign rights, a particular responsibility for integration falls to the legislature. The Lisbon Treaty provides for the transfer of sovereign rights by nation states to the Union, in many cases without requiring formal ratification. The court’s ruling makes it very clear that this is not possible without the parliament’s agreement. The necessary democratic legitimation needs to come from the citizens, not governments.

At the same time, it is vital that Germany retains its capacity to act at an international and a European level. The Constitutional Court has also taken this into account by emphasizing the compatibility of European law and the German constitution. Germany’s role as a motor of integration is not called into question by this ruling. Germany is part of a federation of states whose historical success is based on a capacity for compromise and the renunciation of national unilateralism. Equally important is the fact that only those with a degree of flexibility can hope to exert a significant influence on policy at the EU level.

IP: New World Order
There are a range of catch phrases and issues: “effective multilateralism” or “networked security,” reform of the UN, WTO and IMF, expansion of the G-8 to the G-20: How should German foreign policy handle the rise of emerging powers?

Westerwelle: Emerging powers like India, China, and Brazil have long ceased to be developing countries, and are now playing a decisive role in world politics. And their influence on world affairs will only increase in the future. The role such countries play in global security, energy, climate change, health care, and food production is now central to any policy addressing these fields. In effect this constitutes an enormous challenge for the West because we must cooperate more closely with states that do not necessarily share our values and in fact may actually violate them. On the one hand, we therefore have a strong interest in strengthening the United Nations and thus the rule of law in international relations. On the other hand, we need to call on emerging powers to assume a greater degree of responsibility in return for greater influence on international policy.

With regard to Afghanistan, for instance, China, Russia, and India are three large states that have just as little interest in seeing the return of the Taliban regime as we do in the West. However, the contributions of these countries to the stabilization of Afghanistan are comparatively modest at present. In my opinion, more engagement beyond the mere level of military involvement is needed and is also possible. On another level, the same could be said in relation to North Korea and even Iran.

Moreover, I do not believe we need to be reticent when it comes to asserting values such as universal human rights when confronted with their violation by emerging powers. In our opinion, the principle of non-interference ceases to apply when universal human rights are being systematically violated.

The G-20 and the Doha Development Round illustrate the workings of a globalized world based on participation and cooperation. The reconciliation of interests functions best in multilateral organizations.

IP: Your priorities for German foreign policy?

Westerwelle: We Liberals want to see Germany taking a lead again in a consistent policy of disarmament and arms control. Such a policy creates greater security and increased trust. The trend we have seen in recent years—increasing mistrust and, as a consequence, the danger of a new arms build-up—needs to be reversed by home-grown initiatives. We consider it an enormous failure on Germany’s part to have remained so passive on the subject of disarmament and arms control, although our country enjoys a high degree of credibility in this area. Disarmament and arms control were key elements of rapprochement during the Cold War, and indeed in ending it. Germany has convincingly proved that enduring peace, freedom, and prosperity can be achieved without possessing weapons of mass destruction. This experience can provide a fruitful model. We Germans have no interest in seeing a new arms race on the European continent or in regions on our borders such as the Middle East. Moreover, we increasingly face the danger of terrorists obtaining weapons of mass destruction or the knowledge and technology required to build them. The greater the arms build-up at a state level, the more this danger increases. We therefore need to take decisive steps in the area of nuclear and conventional disarmament. We thoroughly endorse President Obama’s commitment to a world free of nuclear weapons. Germany could set an example by working within NATO toward the withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons still stationed on our soil.

In relation to our neighbors, it is time we started looking eastward and extending the process of reconciliation and the development of close alliances that has been so successful to the west. I would like to see the same deep friendship between Germans and Poles as has now been established between Germans and the French. Germany and others have paid far too little attention to bilateral relationships within the European Union recently. It is clear that increasing the internal cohesion of the European Union ultimately augments our capacity for action in the international arena. Internal European cohesion is based on the principle of equality of all members of the Union. The formation of alliances and “directorates” within the Union contradicts this principle and is therefore a mistake. German foreign and European policy was so successful in the 80s and 90s because we took the interests of smaller states seriously and considered them when formulating our own policies. We have to find our way back to this kind of approach. It is a scandal that the government’s policy toward smaller European countries is so conspicuously marked by derogatory statements from our finance minister.

IP-Global es publicado con el Consejo Alemán de Relaciones Exteriores, Berlin (DGAP) bajo la supervisión del editor en jefe Sylke Tempel (ViSdP).